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The purpose of this paper is to apply economic science to the analysis of the opportunities and 
choices of single individual ‘lone wolf’ terrorists whose attacks are characterised by ‘sprees’ of 
violence that last only for a relatively short period of time. Unlike ‘serial’ lone wolves who engage in 
violent terrorism over a prolonged period of time and unlike those lone wolves who engage in a 
single crudely planned terrorist attack and are apprehended without inflicting significant injuries or 
fatalities, the attacks of spree lone wolves are concentrated in a very short period of time, perhaps no 
longer than several days and sometimes as little as a few hours, and may generate significant levels 
of human tragedy. The spree lone wolf also emerges suddenly. Having previously allocated no 
resources to violent terrorism, he suddenly and all at once allocates 100 percent of his resources, 
including time, to violent terrorism. The first step to providing guidance to governments and their 
security and law enforcement agencies is to encompass some important elements of the spree lone 
wolf’s opportunities and choices within an economic analytical framework. The first steps towards 
this encompassment are undertaken in this paper by exploring the opportunities and choices of the 
spree lone wolf from a risk-reward perspective and a treatment of the spree lone wolf as an individual 
who, while attempting to maximise his expected utility, shuns the risk-reduction benefits of ‘time 
diversification’ and suddenly plunges all of his resources into violent terrorism within a single time 
period.  
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LONE WOLF TERRORISM AND SPREES OF VIOLENCE 
 
A lone wolf terrorist operates independently, alone, outside of a command structure. Some lone 
wolves have been able to inflict greater amounts of human tragedy than some terrorist organisations. 
Lone wolf terrorists are dangerous. Because of their independence, the pre-emption of lone wolves by 
law enforcement is extremely difficult. Lone wolves are not a part of a terrorist organisation or a part 
of a terrorist network. There is nothing for law enforcement agents to infiltrate. After the lone wolf 
strikes, he reveals his existence and evidence may be gathered by law enforcement. With each attack, 
more evidence accumulates and the unique features of the attacks begin to point towards a unique 
offender. This approach to the law enforcement and security operations pertaining to the pursuit of the 
lone wolf is well suited to the pursuit of the ‘serial’ lone wolf who strikes, withdraws and strikes again 
over an extended period of time. The ‘spree’ lone wolf is different and represents a different challenge 
to law enforcement. The terrorist actions of the spree lone wolf are concentrated within a very short 
period of time. Law enforcement efforts directed towards the pursuit of the ‘spree’ lone wolf must be 
condensed and investigative efforts must proceed on the basis of either limited evidence or rapidly 
evolving and accumulating evidence. In some cases there may be no time for an investigative process 
at all.  
 
If defence economics is to contribute to the pre-emption or pursuit of the spree lone wolf, the spree 
lone wolf’s opportunities and choices must be delineated. The spree lone wolf’s opportunities are 
characterised by the payoffs that he may expect from engaging in violent terrorism and the risks that 
attend each of the expected payoffs. The lone wolf’s choices are characterised by an attempt to 
optimise his expected payoffs at the level of risk that he is willing to bear. A lone wolf who engages 
in violent terrorism must choose an attack method. Each attack method is expected to inflict a 
particular level of human tragedy: injuries and fatalities. Each attack method is risky. The actual level 
of human tragedy that is inflicted when a particular attack method is used may be greater or less than 
that which was expected. For example, a bombing device may detonate prematurely and inflict more 
injuries and fatalities than the terrorist expected; or the terrorist might be apprehended whilst planting 
a bombing device; or it may fail to detonate; or fewer people are present at the targeted location than 
expected. When the spree lone wolf chooses an attack method, he chooses an expected payoff and 
risk. The lone wolf’s opportunities are his feasible combinations of expected payoff and risk. The lone 
wolf’s choices are his attempt to choose the attack method that will yield the highest expected payoff 
at the level of risk he wishes to bear.  
 
The difference between a serial lone wolf and a spree lone wolf is the time-concentrated nature of the 
deployment of the chosen attack methods. If the choices of the spree lone wolf are to be understood, 
this aspect of his behaviour must be encompassed within an economic analytical framework. As 
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previous work has shown2, the opportunities and choices of serial lone wolves can be encompassed 
within an economic analytical framework that depicts the lone wolf as an individual who attempts to 
optimise expected utility on the basis of the expected payoffs and risks that characterise each of the 
available attack methods or attack method combinations. To ensnare the spree lone wolf within this 
framework requires an exposition of the circumstances or conditions under which a lone wolf terrorist 
will ‘plunge’ all of his resources, including time, into violent terrorism. What is also required is an 
exposition, drawn from economic theory, of the behavioural aspects that will characterise this type of 
lone wolf terrorist. Once this is accomplished, further conclusions may be reached and inferences may 
be drawn that will help to shed some light on the structure of the opportunities and choices that 
underlie the phenomenon of ‘spree’ lone wolf terrorism.  
 
THE EXPECTED PAYOFFS AND RISKS OF DIFFERENT TERRORIST ATTACK METHODS 
 
RAND identifies ten attack methods that have been deployed by transnational terrorists over the past 
four decades: armed attacks, arson, assassination, hijacking, hostage-taking, kidnapping, bombing, 
unconventional attacks, ‘other’ and ‘unknown’. Each known form of terrorist attack method may be 
placed within one of these categories. If particular types of terrorist attacks emerge as distinct 
categories over time, they may be designated to a new category. For example, the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks are currently categorised under the heading of ‘unconventional attacks’. However, if such a 
type of attack were to recur with greater frequency and become both distinct and conventional a new 
attack method category may be formed. The RAND categories have emerged with the historical 
evolution of transnational terrorism. They are complete with reference to known forms of attack. 
Innovations in terrorist attack methods, to the extent that they occur, will shape the RAND categories 
over time.  
 
Among transnational terrorist incidences, the most commonly used attack method is bombing. 
Between 1968 and 2007, there were 17,856 transnational terrorist incidences involving the utilisation 
of bombing. The second most commonly utilised attack method is armed attacks. There were 7,114 
incidences of armed attacks during the period. Unconventional attacks such as the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks were the least commonly used attack method. RAND records only 56 unconventional attacks 
for the entire period. This indicates that for the most part terrorists deploy tried, tested and more 
common attack methods. These are also the attack methods for which terrorists may have a greater 
knowledge of the distribution of injuries and fatalities. These more common types of attack methods 
have proven to be effective at causing a level of human tragedy. Bombing attacks generated the 
highest number of fatalities and injuries. During the period 1968 to 2007, there were 120,550 fatalities 
                                                 
2 Phillips (2011). 
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and injuries from transnational terroristic bombing attacks. Armed attacks resulted in 26,310 fatalities 
and injuries between 1968 and 2007. Unconventional attacks resulted in 5,444 fatalities and injuries. 
Unconventional attack methods have generated the highest level of human tragedy proportionally 
with the number of incidences of unconventional attacks that have been observed. Just 56 attacks 
resulted in more than 5000 injuries and fatalities. On the same calculation, hostage-taking ranks 
second. Just 210 incidences of transnational hostage-taking have generated more than 3000 injuries 
and fatalities. 
 
Table 1 Attack Methods and Human Tragedy 
Attack Type 
Total Number of Incidences 
1968 to 2007 
Total Fatalities and Injuries 
1968 to 2007 
Armed Attacks 7114 26310 
Arson 1019 709 
Assassination 2357 4282 
Hostage 210 3123 
Bombing 17856 120550 
Hijacking 229 858 
Kidnapping 2164 1641 
Other 168 578 
Unconventional 56 5444 
Unknown 404 836 
 
A terrorist who chooses to engage in violent terrorism and deploy one or more of these attack methods 
must expect some level of human tragedy to result. Even the non-overtly violent attack method of 
hostage-taking must be expected to inflict injuries and fatalities. The number of injuries and fatalities 
that can be expected to result from the deployment of one of the attack methods may be approximated 
by the arithmetic mean of the injuries and fatalities that have been generated per attack per year for 
each attack method as reflected in the historical time-series data reported by RAND. Each time a 
terrorist chooses to deploy a particular attack method he faces the prospect that the actual injuries and 
fatalities that he inflicts will diverge more or less from the expected (mean or average) amount of 
human tragedy. This is the risk that he must bear. This risk can be measured by the variance or 
standard deviation of the injuries and fatalities historically generated per attack per year for each 
attack method. The greater the variance or standard deviation, the greater is the chance that the 
deployment of a particular attack method will result in a magnitude of injuries and fatalities that 
diverges from that which the terrorist had expected.   
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Table 2 Expected Injuries and Fatalities (Payoffs) and Risks 
Attack Type 
Average Fatalities and 
Injuries Per Attack Per 
Year 
Standard 
Deviation 
Armed Attacks 5.32 15.00 
Arson 0.72 1.85 
Assassination 1.54 0.71 
Hostage 11.46 38.18 
Bombing 5.88 6.09 
Hijacking 3.91 10.82 
Kidnapping 0.46 0.35 
Other 1.14 3.02 
Unconventional 7.48 42.94 
Unknown 1.11 4.04 
 
Each of the attack methods is characterised by an expected payoff and risk. The availability of the 
various categories of attack methods with their attendant expected payoffs and risks presents the 
terrorist with a set of opportunities. His opportunities are, fundamentally, opportunities to obtain a 
particular expected payoff in return for bearing the associated risk. His opportunities are expected 
payoff-risk ‘pairs’. There are no risk-free attack methods. In order to obtain expected payoffs, the 
terrorist must bear risk. The more risk that he is willing to bear, the more payoff he can expect. Of 
course, with higher risk comes the increased chance that the actual outcome of his attacks will be 
different from that which he expected. Hostage-taking and unconventional attacks are characterised 
by very high risk but have very high expected payoffs. Assassination, arson and kidnapping are 
characterised by relatively low risk but have relatively low expected payoffs. The lone wolf who 
contemplates the deployment of any of these attack methods confronts an inherent risk-reward trade-
off. It is a trade-off that he cannot escape. If he wishes to generate higher expected payoffs from his 
engagement in violent terrorism he must bear greater risk.    
 
THE ATTACK METHOD CHOICES OF THE LONE WOLVES 
 
The attack method choices of the lone wolves have not been distinctly different from the choices of 
the transnational terrorists3. Armed attacks and bombings, the attack methods most commonly chosen 
by transnational terrorists, are also the most common choices of attack method among lone wolves. In 
the United States, at least 32 lone wolf terrorists were actively engaged in violent terrorism in the 
period between 1940 and 2007. The majority of these lone wolves—28 of the 32—inflicted injuries 
and fatalities. In Europe, 39 lone wolf terrorists were active between 1968 and 2007. Of the 71 
American and European lone wolf terrorists engaged in violent acts of terrorism, armed attacks and 
                                                 
3 Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement (2007).  
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bombings constituted the attack method choices for 49 of the terrorists. Other, less popular, attack 
methods include hijacking or hostage-taking (chosen by fourteen of the European lone wolves), 
assassination (chosen by three of the lone wolves) and arson (chosen by four of the lone wolves). In 
deploying these attacks, the lone wolf can expect to inflict injuries and fatalities. The actions of the 
transnational terrorists have produced a historical record of injuries and fatalities that have been 
associated with each of the attack methods. Over a long period of time an average or expected number 
of injuries and fatalities has come to characterise each attack method. The extent to which the 
outcomes of a particular attack may diverge from the outcomes that were expected is reflected by the 
variance or standard deviation which characterises the historical time series of injuries and fatalities. 
The lone wolf cannot escape from this inherent trade-off between expected payoffs and risk.  
 
The trade-off between the injuries and fatalities that can be expected and the risk that the actual 
deployment of a particular attack method will result in more or less human tragedy has proven to be 
adequate to entice individuals to engage in violent lone wolf terrorism. The result has been a long list 
of fatalities and an even longer list of injuries. Between 1940 and 2007, the 32 lone wolf terrorists 
actively operating within the United States were responsible for 87 fatalities and 322 injuries. To 
place this in perspective, the 2nd of June Movement, predominantly deploying the same attack 
methods of armed attack and bombing, inflicted 5 fatalities and 3 injuries in a decade-long 
engagement in violent terrorism. The Army of God, predominantly deploying bombing and 
assassination, inflicted 3 fatalities and 124 injuries in a fourteen-year engagement in violent terrorism. 
Black September, predominantly deploying bombing, inflicted 77 fatalities and 121 injuries in a six 
year engagement in terrorism that involved striking targets in cities across the world, including New 
York, London, Cairo, Geneva, West Berlin and Rome. The Red Army Faction inflicted 16 fatalities 
and 62 injuries during a thirty-year-long campaign. There are, of course, many other terrorist groups 
who engaged in violent terrorism but who inflicted no injuries or fatalities4. Well-organised and 
financed terrorist organisations have sometimes been no more dangerous than a relatively small 
number of lone wolves operating alone and outside of a command structure.  
 
Lurking behind the macro-statistical data are important differences between the lone wolves. 
Although the attack method choices are relatively uniform or, at the very least, can be placed within 
one of the RAND attack method categories, the lone wolves remain idiosyncratic in many of the ways 
in which they deploy these attack methods. A lot of these idiosyncrasies are absorbed by the fact that 
all attack methods are fundamentally characterised by an expected payoff and risk. Regardless of the 
uniqueness of the lone wolf’s approach, his opportunities and choices are characterised by ‘pairs’ of 
expected payoffs and risks. An important idiosyncrasy that is not completely transcended by this 
                                                 
4 All data are from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) or RAND. 
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characterisation is the difference between the ‘spree’ lone wolf and the ‘serial’ or ‘standard’ lone wolf 
terrorist. An archetypal serial lone wolf is Theodore Kaczynski, a.k.a. ‘The Unabomber’. Between 
1978 and 1995 Kaczynski mailed sixteen parcel and letter-bombs to various targets around the United 
States. The attacks occurred intermittently over this seventeen year period with large periods of time 
passing without an attack. Despite the intermittent nature of the attacks, Kaczynski persistently 
pursued his campaign for almost two decades. The stable structure of the evidence produced by his 
engagement in terrorist violence permitted the construction by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of 
an offender profile. Evidence gradually accumulated and pointed towards a single offender. This 
stands in direct contradistinction to the actions of those lone wolf terrorists who have condensed their 
engagement in violent terrorism into a very short period of time. These are the lone wolf terrorists 
who have engaged in ‘sprees’.  
 
A shooting spree is the type of attack that immediately springs to mind. This is, no doubt, due to the 
popular usage of the word ‘spree’ in describing various acts of concentrated violence, especially those 
involving the use of firearms. However, a spree need not only involve shooting or armed attacks and it 
need not take place all on one day. A spree might involve bombing and the acts of violence may be 
continuous over a period of several days. If this definition is accepted, both Joseph Christopher and 
David Copeland are examples of the ‘spree’ lone wolf. Copeland engaged in a 13-day bombing spree 
in London in 1999. He planted bombs in crowded areas on Saturday April 17, Saturday April 24 and 
Friday April 30. The bombs, laden with nails to maximise the number of injuries and fatalities, 
resulted in three fatalities and 129 injuries. Although Christopher has characteristics that could define 
him as a serial lone wolf5, four of his fatalities were inflicted during a three-day shooting spree in 
New York State in September 1980. The challenges presented by spree lone wolves to investigators 
are clearly evident in both of these cases. Neither Christopher nor Copeland was apprehended at the 
scene of their attacks. Christopher might not have been apprehended at all but for the fact that he later 
bragged about his crimes. Copeland was identified by a colleague who recognised him from the 
security-camera vision police had released to the public. This information was provided to police just 
before the final attack—which killed three and injured 79. Even though police now knew who the 
offender was, his last deadly bombing could not be prevented6.  
 
                                                 
5 Christopher is known as both the ‘0.22 Calibre Killer’ and ‘The Midtown Slasher’. After his initial spree, 
Christopher changed his preferred murder weapon to a knife, which he used to attack his victims and stab them 
to death.  
6 These facts were obtained from the relevant Wikipedia entries and Instituut voor Veiligheids en 
Crisismanagement (2007) and checked against the original news sources.  
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The archetypal modern example of the spree lone wolf is almost certainly Anders Behring Breivik. In 
Norway in July 2011 Breivik engaged in a bombing and shooting spree in that resulted in the deaths 
of 77 people. The attacks were undertaken in two parts. First, a car bomb was left outside the 
government building that housed the offices of the Prime Minister. The bomb was detonated and 
killed eight people. This is exactly what would be expected from an ‘average’ bombing attack. 
Breivik then travelled approximately 40 kilometres to a youth camp where he murdered another 69 
people in an hour-long shooting spree. For a terrorist attack that might be categorised as an ‘armed 
assault’, 69 fatalities is many standard deviations from the mean number of fatalities historically 
generated in such attacks7. Although many details remain to be confirmed, on the basis of currently 
available information, Breivik’s attacks represent an archetypal example of lone wolf terrorism and a 
rare example of combination of attack methods by a spree lone wolf. By combining attack methods, 
the lone wolf terrorist can obtain increases in the expected numbers of injuries and fatalities without 
bearing additional risk (Phillips 2009; 2011). This is a property of the correlation structure that 
characterises the expected payoffs to different attack methods. In this particular case, Breivik’s 
combination of attack methods appears also to have contributed to the increase in expected injuries 
and fatalities by diverting law enforcement attention to the location of the bombing whilst the 
shooting spree took place some distance away. Whether this was planned or, as has been reported8, 
the shooting spree was undertaken after it became clear that the car bomb did not collapse the 
government building, may remain unknown.  
 
Bombing and armed attacks are the dominant attack methods of choice for the lone wolf terrorist. 
When these attack methods are deployed in a concentrated period of time, the attacks may constitute 
examples of spree lone wolf terrorism. Spree lone wolves represent unique challenges to law 
enforcement agencies charged with their pre-emption or apprehension. Because of the time-
concentrated nature of the attacks, the investigative process evolves exceedingly quickly. Even if law 
enforcement agencies become aware of the identity of the lone wolf terrorist, there may not be enough 
time to intercept him before he strikes again. Even if law enforcement become aware that a ‘spree’ 
attack is in progress, many injuries and fatalities may be inflicted before the law enforcement 
response effectively neutralises the spree lone wolf terrorist. Despite the difficulties presented by 
spree terrorism, the decision-making framework of the spree lone wolf reduces to one that is 
                                                 
7 What might be required is some estimate of an expected number of injuries and fatalities from shooting sprees 
in confined locations, such as schools, campuses or youth camps. The injuries and fatalities inflicted by lone 
shooters (though not necessarily lone wolf terrorists) have sometimes been very substantial. The mean and 
standard deviation of the injuries and fatalities inflicted by such specialised armed attacks may represent the 
statistical foundation for a new attack method category.   
8 AFP, November 19 2011.  
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characterised by opportunities and choices. Both opportunities and choices can be further delineated 
within a risk-reward (expected payoff-risk) analytical framework that may begin to encompass the 
spree lone wolf. Once encompassed to some degree within an economic analytical framework, further 
insights into the behaviour of the spree lone wolf may be obtained. Ideally, these insights will provide 
advice that is operationally relevant to law enforcement agencies engaged in the pursuit of spree lone 
wolf terrorists.  
 
THE LONE WOLF: A MODEL OF CHOICE 
 
Building upon the economic analysis of crime and criminal behaviour (Becker 1968; Ehrlich 1973), 
the terrorist is usually depicted as attempting to maximise an expected utility function (Landes 1978; 
Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley 1983; Enders and Sandler 1993). Factors that are salient to the 
particular choice problem confronting the terrorist or terrorist organisation are included within an 
expected utility function. Some of these factors contribute positively to utility. For example, monetary 
payoffs from ransoms or (non-pecuniary) concessions granted by the government contribute 
positively to the terrorist’s utility. Some factors contribute negatively to utility. For example, the 
penalties imposed on terrorists who are apprehended. If, for a particular terrorist activity, the chances 
of positive payoffs increase or the absolute amount of the positive payoffs increase, terrorists might be 
encouraged to participate in that activity. If, however, the chances of failure increase or the absolute 
magnitude of the negative payoffs (penalties) increases, terrorists might be deterred from participating 
in the activity. This ‘deterrence’ effect, which is derived from economic analysis, operates alongside a 
‘substitution’ effect. The terrorist who is deterred from one activity may substitute for it another type 
of activity. The careful exposition of the simultaneous operation of the deterrence and substitution 
effects is one of the fundamental contributions of defence economics to the study of terrorism and 
terrorist behaviour. The analysis is well-supported by empirical evidence9.   
 
A simple generic expected utility function for the terrorist can be constructed as:  
 
( ) ( )∑=
z
t zzuEU π      (1) 
 
Where E is the expectations operator, z is the expected payoff of the terrorist activity, ( )zu  is a utility 
function that relates the expected payoff to the terrorist’s utility and ( )zπ  is the subjective probability 
                                                 
9 For example, the fortification of US embassies reduced direct attacks on these locations. However, there was 
an increase in assassinations and other types of terrorist activity directed towards embassy personnel outside of 
the fortified areas (Sandler and Enders 2004).  
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of an outcome (Phillips 2005). This generic utility function can be augmented to any degree of 
complexity in order to capture the salient features of different terrorism scenarios. For example, 
Landes (1978) was interested in hijacking. He constructed the (non-generic) expected utility function 
as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )CWUPPSWUPPWUPEU jcaicaja −−+−+−= 11     (2)  
 
Here the hijacker’s expected utility depends upon the probability of apprehension in country i, aP , the 
probability (given apprehension) of being convicted and sentenced to prison, cP , the hijacker’s 
wealth, iW  and jW , in each of two countries, i and j, the monetary equivalent of the sentence, S, in 
country i and the monetary costs, C, associated with apprehension but no sentence (example, costs of 
defence). Similarly, Sandler et al. (1983) were interested in hostage-taking scenarios where terrorists 
made demands on the government. They constructed the expected utility function as: 
 
( )*;,, CDLUU Π=        (3) 
 
The terrorist has an objective. This may, perhaps, be the promotion of a particular cause. There are 
two ways that this objective may be achieved. The first is by legal methods, such as lobbying or 
producing and distributing pamphlets. These activities have a payoff L. The second is by illegal or 
terroristic methods that involves taking hostages and making demands, D, of the government. The 
outcome of this risky activity is uncertain. The probability that the demands are met is Π  and the 
most recent concession granted by the government is C*.  
 
In Sandler et al.’s model, the government also has an expected utility function: 
 
( )*;,, 2 DaCGG Ω=        (4) 
 
The government’s expected utility depends upon its concessions policy, C, the probability of re-
election Ω , the amenities of office, a2, and the demands of the terrorists, D*. With these two 
expected utility functions in place, the economic analysis proceeds to the examination of various 
‘comparative statics’. This means that, holding all other variables constant, the logical outcomes of 
changes in one of the parameters are explored. The interaction between the terrorists and the 
government in a hostage-taking negotiation scenario yields a number of important comparative statics 
results within the Sandler et al. (1983) theoretical framework, including the ‘deterrence’ and 
‘substitution’ effects.  
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Although important results have been derived from the application of orthodox expected utility 
analysis to the study of terrorism and terrorist behaviour, the results are not usually directly 
operationally relevant. This should not be taken to mean that the results are impractical but rather, to 
the extent that the results inform and guide law enforcement actions, they usually do so at a high level 
and do not penetrate to the operational level where such matters as the pre-emption of terrorist attacks 
at particular targets, the planning for particular types of attack methods that terrorists may deploy 
and the pursuit of particular individual terrorists occupy the attention of particular law enforcement 
agents. To derive directly operationally relevant results, the expected utility theoretical framework 
must be made to work in a different way such that computable results emerge from the analysis and 
the expected utility theoretical framework must be used in a different way such that inferences about 
individual terrorists or terrorist organisations can be drawn from a combination of the theoretical 
framework and the evidence that characterises the scene and nature of particular terrorist attacks. In 
this way, the application of the expected utility theory to the analysis of terrorism can be taken to the 
operational level as an additional tool that may be deployed in the investigative process.  
 
Computable results can be obtained from a mean-variance expected utility framework. Within this 
framework, the terrorist’s expected utility function contains just two arguments: (1) mean (expected 
payoff); and (2) variance (risk). The formal logic of choice operates in the same manner as the 
standard expected utility analysis but the analysis is less abstract in the sense that the complete choice 
set and the set of optimal choices is computable if the payoffs that characterise the opportunities and 
choices are empirically observable. Phillips (2009) shows how this approach generates an opportunity 
set of terrorist attack methods and attack method combinations and derives an optimal or ‘efficient’ 
set of attack method combinations that have the highest expected payoffs for each level of risk. 
Phillips (2009) measures the payoffs in terms of the injuries and fatalities generated by each attack 
method and combination. This approach has the significant advantage of equating the optimal choices 
of terrorists with their most dangerous choices. Critics of the optimisation process inherent within the 
economic analysis of choice must concede that even if the terrorist may make mistakes in his choices 
of attack methods, it is far better to be prepared for his most dangerous (optimal) choices than to rely 
on him making a mistake.  
 
The generic mean-variance expected utility function may be expressed as: 
 
( )2, RREfU σ=        (5) 
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Equation (5) says that the terrorist’s expected utility is a function of the expected payoffs, R, and the 
variance or risk of those payoffs, 2Rσ . If the payoffs to terrorist attacks are measured in terms of 
injuries and fatalities10, each terrorist attack method has an expected payoff approximated by the 
mean of the injuries and fatalities generated empirically by the deployment of the particular attack 
method. The risk that the terrorist must bear in order to obtain a particular expected payoff is reflected 
by the empirically observed variance of the payoffs. Bombs sometimes do not explode on time or at 
all. Terrorists are sometimes apprehended during an attack. Fewer (or more) people sometimes gather 
at the target location than anticipated. Police or security agents sometimes discover a bombing device 
before it detonates. And so on. The variance reflects the degree to which the actual outcomes diverge 
from those which were expected. When payoffs are measured in terms of injuries and fatalities, the 
variance reflects the degree to which the actual injuries and fatalities that are inflicted by a terrorist 
attack method may diverge from the number of injuries and fatalities that the terrorist expected. The 
actual number may be higher or lower than expected.  
 
A mean-variance analysis based on the injuries and fatalities that empirically characterise RAND’s 
attack method categories permits the delineation of the terrorist’s opportunities and provides the 
foundation for an analysis of the terrorist’s optimal choice. The complete opportunity set is simply the 
complete set of expected payoff-risk ‘pairs’ associated with every feasible attack method and attack 
method combination. Because of the statistical structure of the payoffs to each attack method, 
specifically the correlation structure of the payoffs, the terrorist’s set of opportunities will be a convex 
set in expected payoff-risk space. The imperfect correlation that characterises the injuries and 
fatalities generated by each attack method ensure that a linear opportunity set is never observed and a 
concave opportunity set is impossible because such a geometrical property would be associated with 
more-than-perfectly-positive correlation. The terrorist’s opportunity set must look something like this:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 This should not be a controversial approach. Violent terrorism inflicts injuries and fatalities. Terrorists, unless 
they are completely naive, expect injuries and fatalities to result from their violent terrorist actions. It is a small 
step, in light of both the words and deeds of terrorists which make it very clear that inflicting a maximum 
amount of human tragedy is immediate objective, to work from the position that terrorists attempt to maximise 
injuries and fatalities. The mean-variance expected utility approach would work equally well if the terrorist was 
supposed to ‘optimise’ injuries and fatalities which, in the case of assassination, could mean one single fatality. 
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Figure One The Lone Wolf’s Opportunity Set 
 
 
The optimal and most dangerous choices for the terrorist are those that have the highest expected 
payoff at each level of risk. These can be computed by solving a quadratic programming problem or, 
equivalently, applying Markowitz’s (1952) critical line algorithm. The quadratic programming 
problem involves finding the resource allocation weighting for each attack method contained within a 
combination that yields the highest expected payoff for a given level of risk. The complete set of these 
‘efficient’ combinations will be the uppermost boundary of the complete opportunity set. Each attack 
method or attack method combination contained within the efficient opportunity set has an expected 
payoff that is higher than any other combination at that particular level risk. The efficient set of attack 
methods and combinations is delineated by a dashed line superimposed over the appropriate region of 
the complete set of opportunities: 
 
Figure Two The Lone Wolf’s Efficient Opportunity Set 
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This statistical or algorithmic process permits the calculation of the opportunity set for the terrorist. 
The process will work with any set of payoffs that have a semblance of statistical structure. Once the 
opportunity set is delineated, the terrorist’s choice from that opportunity set may be analysed. As a 
model of individual choice in the purest sense, this analytical framework is particularly well-suited to 
the analysis of the choices of lone wolf terrorists. The lone wolf must choose from the opportunity set. 
Though he may wish to deploy an attack method that inflicts a very high level of human tragedy 
without bearing any risk, there is no feasible opportunity to do so. He cannot escape from the risk-
reward payoff. The lone wolf will choose an attack method or combination of attack methods that 
yields the maximum payoff at the desired level of risk. A very risk averse lone wolf will choose attack 
methods or combinations that have a lower expected payoff and a lower risk. A less risk averse or 
more risk seeking lone wolf will choose attack methods or combinations that have a higher expected 
payoff and higher risk. The choices of these two ‘types’ of lone wolves can be depicted by the set of 
indifference maps superimposed over the opportunity set.  
 
Figure Three The Lone Wolf’s Optimal ‘Most Dangerous’ Choices 
 
 
Mean-variance expected utility analysis approximates full expected utility analysis. It frequently does 
so even when payoffs are not normally distributed or when agents are not described by quadratic 
expected utility. For mean-variance analysis to hold as an approximation, the terrorist need only think 
in terms of a range of equally likely gains and losses centred on zero (Tobin 1958, p.74). Mean-
variance analysis is also able to generate computable results, which makes it a much more suitable 
foundation for the provision of operationally relevant investigative advice than the strictly logical-
theoretical conclusions of state preference theory (Tobin 1969). If ‘quadratic’ utility is used as the 
specific functional form for the generic equation (5), any preference ordering of attack methods 
produced by the quadratic utility function will certainly conform to the well-known von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) axioms. For this reason, the quadratic utility function is usually used as the 
Expected 
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Direction of 
Increasing Utility
Direction of 
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foundation for the analysis of choice within the mean-variance framework. Although there are some 
shortcomings that must be recognised when using this type of expected utility function in certain 
settings, it will, in any case, approximate a broad class of expected utility functions (see Elton et al. 
2003, p.232; Kroll, Levy and Markowitz 1984; Levy and Markowitz 1979).  
 
Following Tobin (1958), the quadratic expected utility function can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( ) 21 RbRbRU σ++=       (6) 
 
The lone wolf ranks his preferences for attack methods and makes choices on the basis of risk 2Rσ  and 
expected payoff R. He will not just rank the attack method with the highest expected injuries and 
fatalities as the best attack method. He will consider the risks involved. The result is a preference 
ranking for attack methods that depends on how the lone wolf feels about the risk-reward ratio of each 
attack method. If the lone wolf happens, for a given payoff, to prefer a smaller variance of payoffs 
(reward) to a larger variance, then 01 <<− b . Like the Becker, Ehrlich and Sandler et al. expected 
utility functions, the quadratic function depicts a terrorist obtaining utility from some factors. In this 
case, the two relevant factors are reward and risk, measured by the injuries and fatalities expected to 
be generated by a terrorist attack and the standard deviation of those injuries and fatalities. Because 
additional reward is ‘good’ and adds to the lone wolf’s utility R enters positively into the function. 
Because additional risk is ‘bad’ and detracts from the lone wolf’s utility, 2Rσ  enters negatively into the 
function for a risk averse lone wolf11. This approach not only simplifies the expected utility analysis 
that is assumed to underlie the lone wolf’s choices but also allows computable results to be generated 
rather than purely logical results. Because we can empirically observe the two moments of the 
distribution of injuries and fatalities generated by terrorist attack methods, we can analyse the lone 
wolf’s choices as if they were made on the basis of this distribution and reach computable numerical 
conclusions about those choices.    
 
Mean-variance analysis provides the foundation for an economic analysis of the opportunities and 
choices of the lone wolf terrorist. It does so in a manner that is more suitable to generating 
operationally relevant computable results. The lone wolf terrorist chooses the most dangerous attack 
method or combination of attack methods at the level of risk he wishes to bear. If he is very risk 
averse he will choose attack methods or combinations that inflict a low amount of human tragedy at a 
low level of risk. If he is more risk seeking he will choose attack methods or combinations that inflict 
a higher amount of human tragedy. He cannot escape the risk-reward trade-off. If he chooses attack 
                                                 
11 We can deal with a situation where risk is good. This will be discussed when risk preferences are considered.  
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methods with a higher expected payoff, he bears greater risk. By using the empirical data for each 
attack method, Phillips (2011) developed an analysis that aimed to identify the attack methods that 
would be chosen by lone wolf terrorists across a range of risk levels. Our task here is to contribute 
further in this direction by applying similar techniques to the analysis of the ‘spree’ lone wolf. The 
objective is to encompass within economic analysis aspects of the behaviour of spree lone wolves 
who are willing to suddenly ‘plunge’ all of their resources, including time, into violent terrorism even 
though they had not previously engaged in violent terrorism. The analysis should permit us to draw 
additional inferences about the types of behaviour that can be expected from such a spree lone wolf 
and identify some of the circumstances that may precipitate a spree. This analysis will take us some 
way closer to providing operationally relevant advice to law enforcement and security agencies tasked 
with pre-empting or pursuing this most dangerous of lone wolf terrorists.  
 
THE SPREE LONE WOLF: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHOICES 
 
Like the serial lone wolf and the transnational terrorist, the spree lone wolf is faced with opportunities 
and the necessity to make a choice. The RAND categories of attack methods, each with their expected 
payoffs and risks and the possibility that they may be combined represent his opportunities. 
Fundamentally, his opportunities are expected payoff-risk ‘pairs’. A serial lone wolf, a transnational 
terrorist or a spree lone wolf, if he chooses optimally, chooses the most dangerous attack method or 
combination of attack methods at his chosen level of risk. One important difference, perhaps the most 
important difference, between the spree lone wolf and the serial lone wolf is the time-concentrated 
nature of the spree lone wolf’s engagement in violent terrorism. Within the expected utility model of 
choice that we have been developing, a spree lone wolf’s most distinct characteristic is his willingness 
to suddenly and all at once ‘plunge’ all of his resources, including time, into violent terrorism when he 
had not previously been engaged in violent terrorism. Only a lone wolf with a particular type of risk 
preference will be observed to suddenly and completely ‘plunge’ all of his resources into violent 
terrorism. What is more, the spree lone wolf who is willing, under certain circumstances, to plunge all 
of his resources into violent terrorism will be extremely sensitive to changes in the expected payoffs 
to violent terrorism. Even a small adjustment to the risk-reward trade-off may precipitate a spree of 
terroristic violence.  
 
Start with a generic lone wolf terrorist. He has no special properties. His immediate objective in 
engaging in violent terrorism is to inflict an amount of human tragedy. He chooses his attack method 
or combination of attack methods such that the injuries and fatalities that are inflicted by his violent 
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terrorism are a maximum for the level of risk that he bears12. A higher expected payoff is 
accompanied by higher risk. Within a mean-variance analytical framework his opportunities can be 
depicted as a convex set of expected payoff-risk pairs. His most dangerous choices will be at the 
uppermost boundary of the opportunity set. His choices will reflect his preference for risk. If he is 
very risk averse his choices will be located in the lower risk range of opportunities. If he is less risk 
averse his choices will be located in the higher risk range of opportunities. A lone wolf has limited 
resources, including time. To the extent that his choices involve engaging in violent terrorism he has 
less time and other resources to allocate to non-violent forms of expression or other legitimate 
activities such as working a regular job. It is the sudden and complete plunge into violent terrorism 
that distinguishes the serial lone wolf and the spree lone wolf. Whereas the serial lone wolf’s 
behaviour can be completely explained as the optimising behaviour of a risk averse individual 
requiring increments in expected payoffs in return for bearing additional risk, the ‘plunging’ 
behaviour of the spree lone wolf—zero allocation of resources to violent terrorism then, suddenly and 
all at once, complete allocation of resources to violent terrorism—is his defining characteristic. The 
analytical tools with which to encompass this aspect of the spree lone wolf emerge from Tobin’s 
(1958, p.76) classical treatment of risk preference.  
 
As we have seen, the opportunities of the lone wolf are a convex set of risk-reward pairs in expected 
payoff-risk space. The convexity of the opportunity set reflects the positive nature of the risk-reward 
trade-off and the gains that may be obtained by combining attack methods. Specifically, combination 
yields increases in expected payoffs without increases in risk. If the lone wolf may exhibit varying 
degrees of specialisation in violent terrorism, the efficient opportunity set will be expanded or 
contracted according to the percentage of his total resources, including time, which he devotes to 
violent terrorist activities. The efficient opportunity set for the non-specialist lone wolf will lie within 
the efficient opportunity set of the lone wolf who devotes a greater percentage of his resources to 
violent terrorism. The efficient opportunity set can be computed for different levels of specialisation. 
The solution process for Markowitz’s (1952) critical line algorithm involves computing the optimal 
resource allocations across different attack methods when the total resource allocations (weightings) 
to the different attack methods may not exceed 1.00 or, equivalently, a resource allocation of 100 
percent. If the lone wolf does not specialise in violent terrorism, the total resource allocation must be 
less than 1.00. The Markowitz approach applies equally well in such scenarios where the total 
resource allocation is 5 percent, 10 percent, 18 percent, 75 percent and so on.  
                                                 
12 Note that if the lone wolf wishes to inflict a small number of fatalities, he can choose an attack method that 
has a lower expected payoff and lower risk. However, even with a less overtly violent attack method such as 
hostage-taking, injuries and fatalities may be high. The risk associated with each attack method encompasses the 
possibility that the actual number of fatalities generated by an attack will higher than expected.  
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Using the RAND data for injuries and fatalities generated by each attack method, the Markowitz 
critical line algorithm can be applied to scenarios where the lone wolf specialises to different degrees. 
By specialisation we mean the allocation of resources, including time, to violent terrorism—either 
single attack methods or combinations of attack methods—rather than specialisation in sense of a 
single attack method. At each level of risk and each level of specialisation, the investigator may 
determine which attack method combination13 yields the highest expected payoff. Formally, the 
opportunity sets at various levels of specialisation are computed by solving the quadratic 
programming problem with resource allocation constraints of 0.10, 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75: 
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Our very non-specialist lone wolf who allocates only 10 percent of resources to terrorism has 
significantly less opportunity for exploiting the gains from combination. As a consequence, his 
efficient set of opportunities is situated relatively farther to the South-West in expected payoff-risk 
space. Our ‘mid range’ specialist lone wolves allocate (a) 25 percent; (b) 50 percent; and (c) 75 
percent of resources to terrorism. As the allocation increases—as the degree of specialisation 
increases—more opportunities become available to generate higher expected payoffs at each given 
level of risk. This is the exploitation of the underlying statistical structure of the attack methods. The 
benefits from combination begin to become apparent when the expected payoffs at each level of risk 
are compared at different levels of specialisation. Where the very non-specialist lone wolf could not 
form an attack method combination with an expected payoff in excess of 1.00 fatalities and injuries, 
the 25 percent allocation is mostly characterised by attack method combination opportunities with 
expected payoffs in excess of 1.00 fatalities and injuries. Furthermore, even at the same level of risk 
there are feasible combinations at the 25 percent level of resource allocation that yield higher fatalities 
and injuries. Of course, a further increase in specialisation to 50 percent resource allocation to 
                                                 
13 We work, for the moment, on the basis that the lone wolf can form a combination constituted by more than 
one attack method.  
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terrorism yields a similar increment in the expected level of human tragedy for each level of risk, as 
too does a further increase to 75 percent. Each time, the opportunity set moves further to the North-
West in expected payoff-risk space.  
 
The efficient opportunity sets for each level of specialisation, including complete specialisation in 
violent terrorism, emerge geometrically as: 
 
Figure Four The Lone Wolf’s Efficient Opportunity Sets (Computed with RAND Data) 
 
 
At all of these levels of specialisation—10 percent, 25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent and 100 
percent—familiar patterns emerge to characterise the lone wolf’s opportunities to inflict human 
tragedy. A combination of assassination and bombing dominates the lowest risk combinations across 
all levels of specialisation whereas the higher risk combinations are dominated by bombing, hostage-
taking and unconventional attacks across all of the levels of specialisation. Arson is all but ruled out 
whilst armed attacks feature in a large proportion of the attack method combinations across all levels 
of specialisation. Armed attacks do not dominate the attack method combinations at any level of risk 
but they are present. When full combination of the attack methods is available to the lone wolf, the 
statistical structure of the attack method combinations diminishes or enhances the expected 
prevalence of any particular attack method. Fundamentally, the statistical structure highlights the 
gains that may accrue to the lone wolf by combining attack methods and reveals the structure of the 
opportunities available to the lone wolf at each level of risk. As the lone wolf becomes more 
specialised, his opportunities for inflicting human tragedy increase at each level of risk.  
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Risk 
Efficient Opportunity Set: 100 Percent Allocation
Efficient Opportunity Set: 75 Percent Allocation
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Efficient Opportunity Set: 25 Percent Allocation
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The optimal and most dangerous choices of the lone wolf may be depicted as the maximisation of an 
expected utility function of the form: 
 
( ) ( ) 21 RbRbRU σ++=       (6) 
 
In the case of risk aversion 01 <<− b . This does not mean that the lone wolf will not bear risk but 
only that he requires increments in expected payoffs for bearing additional risk. He maximises his 
expected utility by weighing up the risk-reward trade-offs presented to him by the opportunity set. If 
he is very risk averse, he will choose a lower level of specialisation and a combination of attack 
methods that has a lower expected payoff and lower risk. The indifference curves associated with this 
type of lone wolf are very steeply concave in expected payoff-risk space. A possible solution for this 
lone wolf is the point of tangency of the highest indifference curve with the boundary of one of the 
non-specialist efficient opportunity sets: 
 
Figure Five The Risk Averse Lone Wolf’s Optimal Choice  
 
 
If the lone wolf is less risk averse, he may choose a higher level of specialisation and attack method 
combinations that have a higher expected payoff and higher risk. A possible solution for this lone 
wolf is the point of tangency of the highest indifference curve with the boundary of one of higher-
specialisation efficient opportunity sets: 
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Figure Six The Less Risk Averse Lone Wolf’s Optimal Choice 
 
 
It is possible for the risk averse lone wolf to specialise in violent terrorism. A very risk averse lone 
wolf specialist who devotes 100 percent of his resources to violent terrorism will select those attack 
methods and combinations with lower expected payoffs and lower risk. A less risk averse lone wolf 
specialist who devotes 100 percent of his resources to violent terrorism will select those attack 
methods and combinations with higher expected payoffs and high risk. Possible solutions for these 
lone wolves are represented by the points of tangency of the highest indifference curve for each type 
of lone wolf with the boundary of the 100 percent specialisation efficient opportunity set: 
 
Figure Seven The Lone Wolf’s Optimal Choices with 100 Percent of Resources Allocated to Violent 
Terrorism (Lower and Higher Risk Aversion Cases) 
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In order to encompass the spree lone wolf within this analytical framework, it is necessary to move 
beyond the treatment of risk aversion and consider risk seeking behaviour. For transnational terrorists 
and lone wolves, risk aversion accurately reflects the theoretical logic of choices and is in accordance 
with empirical fact. That is, if all terrorists were risk seeking we would only ever see attacks of the 
riskiest kind. A risk seeking individual always seeks the point of maximum expected payoff and 
maximum risk. A risk averse individual, with a particularly low level of risk aversion, may also find 
that his utility is maximised at the point of maximum expected payoff and maximum risk. It is clear, 
however, that this is not an empirical feature of terrorism that is regularly observed. Risk aversion 
encompasses both this less common feature of terrorism and the more common cases where terrorists 
do not engage at the point of maximum risk. Risk aversion will explain nearly all terrorist behaviour. 
A risk seeking lone wolf may, however, be introduced to the analytical framework. He will maximise 
the same quadratic expected utility function: 
 
( ) ( ) 21 RbRbRU σ++=       (6) 
 
But in the case of risk seeking 10 << b . The indifference curves for the risk seeking lone wolf must 
reflect the fact that he is willing to give up expected payoff in order to bear more risk. To reflect this 
defining characteristic of the risk seeking lone wolf, the indifference curves for the risk seeking lone 
wolf will be downward sloping in expected payoff-risk space. As Tobin (1958, p.78) points out, the 
point of maximum risk will always be the point at which utility is maximised for a risk seeking 
individual. Within the analytical context that we have been constructing, the risk seeking lone wolf 
will always be at the point of maximum risk in the 100 percent-specialisation efficient opportunity set. 
This is easily proved by inspection of the relevant geometry: 
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Figure Eight The Risk Seeking Lone Wolf’s Optimal Choice 
  
 
Of the two types of lone wolves, the risk averse lone wolf is the more likely to deploy the types of 
attack methods—armed attacks and bombings—that are associated with the lone wolf activity that has 
been empirically observed. The risk averse lone wolf is also the more likely to be less than completely 
specialised in violent terrorism. He is more likely to devote at least some of his time and resources to 
other activities. The more or less risk averse lone wolf typifies the serial lone wolf terrorism that has 
been empirically observed and encompasses many of the idiosyncrasies exhibited by serial lone wolf 
terrorists. To understand the spree lone wolf it would appear that we must look beyond risk aversion 
to, perhaps, risk seeking behaviour. Unfortunately, we do not find the defining characteristics of the 
spree lone wolf reflected by the risk seeking lone wolf. The risk seeking lone wolf is more likely than 
the risk averse lone wolf to devote all of his resources, including time, to violent terrorism but the 
actual attack methods that he will choose will be dominated by the riskiest attack methods: 
unconventional attacks and hostage-taking. It seems that the exact type of behaviour—no resource 
allocation to violent terrorism then, suddenly, 100 percent allocation to violent terrorism, particularly 
armed attacks or bombing—that most distinguishes the spree lone wolf is not yet reflected in either of 
the cases that we have examined.  
 
There is a special type of risk seeking lone wolf that exhibits the characteristic behaviour of the spree 
lone wolf. This type of lone wolf is willing to absorb additional risk in return for increases in expected 
payoffs. However, unlike the risk averse lone wolf, this type of lone wolf displays diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution of risk for expected payoffs. At higher levels of risk he requires very 
little additional expected payoff in order to be enticed to bear an additional increment of risk. He 
views the risk-reward trade-off in a different way from our other two types of lone wolf terrorist. At 
very high levels of risk, it will take only a very small increase in expected payoff to entice this wolf to 
Expected Payoff
Risk 
Efficient Opportunity Set: 100 Percent Allocation
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bear a lot more risk. This makes him very dangerous. When the expected payoffs to violent terrorism 
increase, this type of lone wolf may suddenly switch all of his resources, including time, to violent 
terrorism. This type of lone wolf will be observed to suddenly switch all of his resources into the risky 
violent attack methods or combinations of attack methods that are available to him where previously 
all of his resources were devoted to other, non-violent activities. All at once he will ‘plunge’ all of his 
resources into the available attack methods. All at once he will engage in a spree.  
 
To encompass this type of behaviour within our analytical framework requires us to think of the 
efficient sets as dynamic rather than presented statically on the printed page. As the correlation 
structures that characterise the relationship of each attack method with the others change through 
time, the opportunity set may move up or down. It will always be a convex set unless the attack 
methods all exhibit perfectly positive correlation with each other but it does not always have to be 
stationary. Law enforcement actions will affect the risk and reward of some attack methods, making 
others more or less desirable and terrorists may innovate. When the risk-reward trade-off is altered, 
the serial lone wolf may adjust his choices in light of the new opportunities but providing his 
preference for risk remains the same, his new choices are unlikely to be very much different from his 
old choices. The most likely outcome is that for the serial lone wolf is that his choices now yield 
higher (or lower) rewards for a given level of risk. The spree lone wolf is different. Before the 
alteration of the risk-reward ratio he lay hidden from law enforcement. He did not allocate any 
resources to violent terrorism. Now the change in the risk-reward ratio brings him forth. His first 
attack is not the beginning of a serial campaign. His first attack is a spree of violence characterised by 
the plunging of all of his resources into violent terrorism. Such behaviour is encompassed by 
indifference curves that are upward sloping in expected payoff-risk space to reflect the special 
property that Tobin (1958) calls ‘plunging’. In our context: no resources allocated to the violent 
terrorism then, following a change in the risk-reward trade-off, all resources ‘plunged’ into violent 
terrorism.  
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Figure Nine The Spree Lone Wolf’s Optimal Choice 
 
 
With the opportunity sets as they stand, the utility maximising position for the lone wolf is zero 
allocation of resources to violent terrorism. However, if he were to perceive an innovation in the risk-
reward trade-offs available to him such that the efficient opportunity sets all move upwards such that 
the uppermost efficient set (100 percent specialisation) intersects an indifference curve higher than 
U2, the lone wolf will ‘plunge’ all of his resources into violent terrorism. The plunging of all 
resources, including time, into violent terrorism may manifest itself as a spree. Where law 
enforcement had been previously unaware of the existence of a potential lone wolf threat because of 
his avoidance of violent terrorist actions, the spree lone wolf now emerges suddenly. He does not 
emerge as an individual who allocates some resources to terrorism and some resources to other 
activities. The spree lone wolf suddenly and all at once plunges all of his resources, including time, 
into violent terrorism. The spree of violence will likely continue until he is apprehended or until he 
perceives that the risk-reward trade-off no longer favours his violent terrorist actions. Due to the time-
concentrated nature of the spree, it is unlikely that the lone wolf’s perceptions will change. He must 
therefore be apprehended in order for the spree to end. 
 
THE PLUNGE AND THE SPREE 
 
The plunging of all resources, including time, into violent terrorism might be accepted by some 
economists as an appropriate analogy for a spree without further justification. However, the 
metaphorical mapping between ‘plunging’ and ‘spree’ behaviour does have a stronger foundation that 
provides further justification for this conclusion. The analysis is formally a single-period analysis. 
Because the single analytical period may align with any period of real chronological time, it is usually 
implicitly assumed within the analysis that opportunities and choices take place over some period of 
chronological time. This implies that some ‘time diversification’ characterises the choices of the lone 
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With the opportunity sets as they currently stand, zero 
allocation to violent terrorism is the utility maximising 
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wolf. Time diversification refers to a property of the statistical structure of the payoffs to risky 
activities. Specifically, the expected variance is lower at longer horizons than at short horizons. For 
any particular series of attack method deployments, the variance of the actual injuries and fatalities 
may be higher after the first two attacks of the series than after six or seven attacks. In this case, the 
allocation of resources to terrorism over time rather than all at once may yield an accumulated amount 
of human tragedy at a lower level of risk. The ‘plunger’ shuns time diversification and pursues the 
risk-reward trade-off that prevails at the single point in time that he decides to ‘plunge’. For the spree 
lone wolf, the actual chronological time period that corresponds to the analytical time period is one 
that is condensed or concentrated into a very small period. The spree occurs not only because the 
spree lone wolf all at once allocates all of his resources to violent terrorism but because he also shuns 
the statistical property of violent terrorism that is reflected by the term ‘time diversification’. 
 
THE SPREE LONE WOLF: SINGLE ATTACK METHOD ONLY 
 
If the lone wolf cannot combine attack methods or if some attack methods are not available, the spree 
lone wolf, in plunging all of his resources into violent terrorism, can also be expected to plunge all of 
his resources into the single available attack method that yields the highest expected payoff at the 
level of risk that he wishes to bear. Both serial lone wolves and spree lone wolves have generally 
chosen armed attacks or bombing as their preferred attack methods, which leads us to suspect that 
combining attack methods is not always feasible14. If lone wolves can only choose a single attack 
method, the opportunity set reduces to a set of risk-reward ‘pairs’ that are formed on the basis of the 
expected payoffs and risks of each of the attack methods and the degree of specialisation in violent 
terrorism that characterises the lone wolf. The lone wolf’s choices when no combination of attack 
methods is possible may be analysed by determining which degree of specialisation and which attack 
method yields the highest expected payoff when only one attack method can be chosen. Formally, at 
different levels of risk solve the quadratic programming problem: 
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14 This was assumed by Phillips (2011) on the basis that a single individual offender may find it difficult to 
allocate resources across more than one attack method during a single period of time.  
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The levels of risk at which this quadratic programming problem was solved are: 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 1.0, 
1.5, 2.0 ...42.5. The degrees of specialisation and attack methods that correspond to the solution of the 
quadratic programming problem at these levels of risk are presented in the tables. At the lowest levels 
of risk, assassination dominates across a range of degrees of specialisation. For example, if the lone 
wolf bears a very small standard deviation (risk) of 0.5 fatalities and injuries per attack, a 71.5 percent 
degree of resource allocation (specialisation) is the optimal choice. As the level of risk that will be 
borne increases, assassination no longer remains an optimal choice and bombing emerges as the 
optimal choice of attack method. For example, at a 4.5 level of risk, a 74.9 percent degree of 
specialisation in bombing is optimal. At still higher levels of risk, the lone wolf will find that it is 
optimal to switch from bombing to hijacking and then to armed attacks. Finally, hostage taking and 
unconventional attacks come to dominate. At each level of risk, there is a single attack method and a 
degree of specialisation that produces the highest expected payoff.  
 
For the spree lone wolf, the relevant question is whether single attack methods will ever yield an 
optimal solution to his utility maximisation problem and, if so, whether a 100 percent resource 
allocation to armed attacks or bombing such has been observed empirically is ever to be expected on 
the basis of the mean-variance expected utility analysis. When the relevant quadratic programming 
problem is solved, it emerges that as risk increases particular attack methods emerge as the optimal 
choice at particular levels of specialisation. At very low levels of risk, the lone wolf who can choose 
only a single attack method will allocate some resources to assassination. His optimal level of 
specialisation in violent terrorism, which in this case is equivalent to his level of specialisation in 
assassination, increases as the level of risk he wishes to bear increases. He never becomes a complete 
specialist—100 percent resource allocation—in assassination because at increasing levels of risk 
higher degrees of specialisation in assassination become dominated by lower degrees of specialisation 
in bombing. As the risk that he is willing to bear increases, his degree of specialisation in violent 
terrorism increases. He becomes a specialist in violent terrorism, which is equivalent to specialisation 
in bombing, at levels of risk (standard deviation) approach 6.00. At higher levels of risk, bombing is 
superseded by hijacking, in which near specialisation may be observed, and at higher still levels of 
risk hijacking is superseded by armed attacks. At levels of risk (standard deviation) that approach 
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15.00 the lone wolf becomes a specialist in violent terrorism and allocates all of his resources to 
armed attacks. At the appropriate levels of risk both bombing and armed attacks represent solutions to 
the spree lone wolf’s utility maximisation problem: maximise injuries and fatalities at 100 percent 
specialisation in violent terrorism when only a single attack method can be chosen.  
 
Table Three The Lone Wolf’s Optimal Choice: Single Attack Method, Varying Specialisation Level 
Risk (Standard Deviation) Degree of Specialisation Attack Method Expected Payoff 
0.1 0.143 Assassination 0.22 
0.2 0.286 Assassination 0.441 
0.3 0.429 Assassination 0.66 
0.4 0.572 Assassination 0.883 
0.5 0.715 Assassination 1.10 
1.0 0.166 Bombing 0.97 
1.5 0.249 Bombing 1.46 
2.0 0.333 Bombing 1.96 
2.5 0.416 Bombing 2.45 
3.0 0.499 Bombing 2.94 
3.5 0.582 Bombing 3.43 
4.0 0.666 Bombing 3.92 
4.5 0.749 Bombing 4.41 
5.0 0.832 Bombing 4.90 
5.5 0.915 Bombing 5.39 
6.0 0.999 Bombing 5.88 
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Table Three The Lone Wolf’s Optimal Choice: Single Attack Method, Varying Specialisation Level 
(Continued) 
Risk (Standard Deviation) Degree of Specialisation Attack Method Expected Payoff 
6.5 
0.609 
Hijacking 
2.38 
7.0 
0.655 
Hijacking 
2.56 
7.5 
0.702 
Hijacking 
2.74 
8.0 
0.749 
Hijacking 
2.93 
8.5 
0.796 
Hijacking 
3.11 
9.0 
0.843 
Hijacking 
3.29 
9.5 
0.890 
Hijacking 
3.47 
10.0 
0.936 
Hijacking 
3.66 
10.5 
0.983 
Hijacking 
3.84 
11.0 
0.743 
Armed Attacks 
3.95 
11.5 
0.777 
Armed Attacks 
4.13 
12.0 
0.810 
Armed Attacks 
4.31 
12.5 
0.844 
Armed Attacks 
4.49 
13.0 
0.878 
Armed Attacks 
4.67 
13.5 
0.912 
Armed Attacks 
4.85 
14.0 
0.945 
Armed Attacks 
5.03 
14.5 
0.979 
Armed Attacks 
5.21 
 
If a lone wolf can choose just one single attack method and cannot combine attack methods, his 
optimal opportunities become a set characterised by a single attack method and a particular level of 
specialisation at particular levels of risk. For the most part, complete specialisation emerges as an 
optimal choice only at small number of points. At very low levels of risk, complete specialisation is 
not expected at all. At the mid-range of risk, we do observe complete specialisation in violent 
terrorism—100 percent allocation of resources to violent terrorist attack methods—with 100 percent 
resource allocation to bombing at 6.00 standard deviation of fatalities and injuries. At the mid-to-high 
ranges of risk we observe almost complete specialisation in hijacking at a 10.5 standard deviation of 
fatalities and injuries and almost complete specialisation in armed attacks at 14.50. At the very highest 
levels of risk, complete specialisation will be observed in hostage taking and, ultimately, in 
unconventional attacks. A lone wolf seeking to bear the highest levels of risk will find that these 
highest levels can only be reached through a complete specialisation in the riskiest attack methods. A 
plunging spree lone wolf who can only choose bombing or armed attacks will find these attack 
methods to solve his utility maximisation problem at their respective levels of risk. The analysis 
agrees with empirical observation.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
The spree lone wolf terrorist presents special challenges to law enforcement. If defence economics is 
to contribute to the pre-emption, pursuit or understanding of the spree lone wolf, the first step is to 
attempt to encompass his most characteristic behaviour within an economic analytical framework. 
The time-concentrated nature of the spree lone wolf’s terrorist actions is the most distinct feature of 
his behaviour. Unlike the serial lone wolf, the spree lone wolf all at once ‘plunges’ all of his 
resources, including time, into violent terrorism. Where before he was not engaged in risky violent 
terrorism he is now suddenly fully engaged in violent terrorist actions. What is more, he shuns the 
‘time diversification’ that characterises the serial lone wolf’s actions and directs all of his resources 
towards a time-concentrated spree of terrorist violence. Within a mean-variance expected utility 
framework, the type of behaviour that characterises a spree lone wolf is reflected by a utility 
maximising individual whose utility maximisation problem is solved by devoting either zero 
resources to violent terrorism or, following an innovation in the risk-reward structure that 
characterises the available attack methods, suddenly plunging 100 percent of his resources into violent 
terrorism. This sudden change is unique to the ‘plunger’ and will not be exhibited by either a risk 
averse lone wolf or an (ordinary) risk seeking lone wolf15.  
 
The distinguishing feature of the spree lone wolf emerges within the mean-variance expected utility 
analysis. If spree behaviour—suddenly plunging all resources, including time, into a time-
concentrated spree of violent terrorism—emerges within the analytical framework it next remained to 
inquire whether an answer as to which attack method the spree lone wolf will plunge his resources 
into could also be extracted from the economic analytical framework. Empirically, lone wolves (and 
transnational terrorists) have been observed to favour armed attacks and bombing. This choice is 
consistent with formal utility maximisation within the mean-variance framework. If the spree lone 
wolf can choose his level of specialisation, the amount of resources he allocates to violent terrorism, 
and tries to inflict a maximum of human tragedy at a given level of risk when only one attack method 
from the RAND categories can be chosen, the formal solution of the relevant quadratic programming 
problem reveals that complete specialisation in bombing or armed attacks is a solution to this utility 
maximisation problem at the respective levels of risk. The lone wolf terrorist who suddenly and all at 
once plunges his resources into violent terrorism in the form of armed attacks or bombing is reflected 
                                                 
15 Both the risk averse and the risk seeking lone wolf may allocate 100 percent of resources to violent terrorism. 
This will always be the case for the risk seeking lone wolf and will sometimes be the case for a risk averse lone 
wolf with a low level of risk aversion. The ‘plunger’ or ‘spree’ lone wolf, however, goes from 0 percent 
allocation to 100 percent allocation all at once.  
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within our economic analytical framework. This reflection yields further insights into the nature of the 
spree lone wolf.  
 
There are several important results that may be of importance to law enforcement: 
 
• The spree lone wolf will be the most sensitive to changes in the risk-reward trade-off. A risk-
seeking lone wolf will already (and always) be at the point of maximum risk and maximum 
expected payoff. A risk averse serial lone wolf will adjust to changes in the risk-reward trade-
off by increasing or decreasing his engagement in violent terrorism or choosing different 
attack methods and combinations but he will never ‘plunge’ or engage in a spree of violence 
in response to changes in the risk-reward trade-off.  
• The spree lone wolf is unlikely to discontinue his spree of violence once it has started. There 
are no features of his profile that would act to mitigate a spree of violence once it has 
commenced. For the spree lone wolf to decide to discontinue his spree of violence, he must 
perceive that the risk-reward trade-off has readjusted such that his utility maximising position 
is once again characterised by a zero allocation of resources to violent terrorism. Given that 
the spree takes place in a very short period of time, there is unlikely to be much opportunity 
for the spree lone wolf to reflect on the changing risk-reward trade-off once the spree is 
underway. For the spree to cease, he must be apprehended. 
• A spree must necessarily be a very violent action. Within the mean-variance framework that 
has been described, a spree occurs when the lone wolf suddenly and all at once plunges all of 
his resources into violent terrorism. This is precipitated by a change (or perception of a 
change) in the risk-reward trade-off that characterises violent terrorism. If the lone wolf’s 
perception is matched by a real upward shift in the efficient opportunity set, every attack 
method and combination now is expected to inflict a higher amount of human tragedy. 
• Armed attacks and bombing represent utility maximising solutions for the spree (and serial) 
lone wolf when he is constrained to choosing a single attack method rather than a 
combination of different attack methods. If the lone wolf wishes to bear less risk, bombing 
will be the single attack method of choice. If more risk is desired, armed attacks will be the 
attack method choice when only one attack method can be chosen. Of course, this agrees with 
the empirically observed choices of lone wolf terrorists.  
 
The spree lone wolf that emerges within the mean-variance expected utility framework is one that 
does not engage in violent terrorism at all when the opportunity sets presented to him do not offer a 
high enough ratio of risk to reward. He allocates no resources to violent terrorism under such 
circumstances. During this time, he may use legitimate or non-violent methods to pursue whatever 
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ends—political, religious, racial etc—motivate him. Or he may harbour his thoughts and motivations 
behind a mask of indifference and give no indication to anyone that he has another dimension to his 
character. Perceiving a change in the risk-reward ratio that characterises violent terrorism, he 
suddenly and all at once allocates all of his resources, including time, to violent terrorism. If he can 
choose only a single attack method, bombing, hijacking, armed attacks, hostage-taking or 
unconventional attacks will represent utility maximising choices at various levels of risk. We know 
that lone wolves have historically favoured armed attacks or bombing and so we may expect the spree 
lone wolf to centre his attention on those types of attack methods. The spree is a time-concentrated 
complete allocation of resources to violent terrorism.  
 
For law enforcement agencies charged with the task of pre-empting or pursuing the spree lone wolf, 
the advice that emerges from the analysis is as follows. As law enforcement agencies already know, 
all lone wolves are difficult to pre-empt because they are almost invisible before they strike. The spree 
lone wolf presents a special challenge in this regard because his first strike will be a spree of violence 
undertaken on the basis of a complete ‘plunge’ of resources into a time-concentrated deployment of 
attack methods. It is clear that the only way to pre-empt a spree lone wolf is for governments to 
provide resources adequate enough for law enforcement and security agencies to collect and analyse 
the very scant information trail produced by a lone wolf. Remember, the lone wolf is not a part of a 
network that may be infiltrated. But he must acquire weaponry and materials from somewhere and he 
may actively seek to further some cause or other by legitimate means before suddenly turning to 
violent terrorism. If the lone wolf was always completely invisible before he strikes, attempts at pre-
emption would be futile. If we conclude that the lone wolf is almost invisible before he strikes, law 
enforcement must be equipped with the resources to penetrate those aspects of the lone wolf’s actions 
that necessitate him to reveal fleeting glimpses of his existence. Once he strikes, law enforcement 
confronts an individual who will not cease his spree of violence until he is apprehended or otherwise 
compromised.  
 
Although the challenges presented to law enforcement by lone wolf terrorism are substantial, the 
analysis shows that the spree lone wolf’s actions must be precipitated by an upward movement in the 
opportunity set (increase in the risk-reward ratio). Effective actions by law enforcement agencies 
serve to increase the risk and decrease the rewards of violent terrorism (decrease the risk-reward 
ratio). Effective law enforcement and vigilant security at public locations serve to ensure that the 
rewards available to violent terrorism do not rise more than proportionately to the risks. This 
represents the most effective check on the spree lone wolf. What must be guarded against at all costs 
is the unfavourable rebalancing through some security initiative of the deterrence-substitution effects 
that characterise terrorism. Defence economists have shown that security initiatives deter but also 
encourage substitution. In the case of spree lone wolf terrorism, the most dangerous implication is that 
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a targeted security initiative shifts law enforcement resources such that a particular type of terrorist 
action at a particular location becomes riskier without increasing the associated rewards (decrease in 
the risk-reward ratio) whilst simultaneously increasing the risk-reward ratio of an alternative attack 
method. If the spree lone wolf senses this set of circumstances, the consequences are clear.  
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